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As long as a culture fits
the marketplace, it succeeds, but when the external realities change, the
culture has to change as well. That’s where the proponents of cultural
determination go astray. They argue that good cultures will mend themselves.
But that’s simply not true. At certain critical stages, radical cultural shifts
are needed, and without leadership, they just don’t happen. IBM’s buttoned-down
army was a perfect vehicle to quickly establish dominance in the fledgling
computer industry. But by the 1980s, it was a drag. Under John Akers and other home-grown
managers, the army lumbered along, missing opportunity after opportunity and
losing market share to faster, more agile competitors such as Compaq, Dell, and
(until the early 1990s) Apple. Now, not only has IBM had to bring in a new CEO
from outside the company, but the new CEO, Lou Gerstner, had to hire key managers
from outside the company to run finance, accounting, human resources, strategy,
the consumer division, and for other key posts.
General Electric’s culture
is often cited as a paragon of successful durability, and its production of
Jack Welch is held up as the proof. But the truth is that Reginald Jones
selected Welch to succeed him as CEO because Welch was a radical deviant from
the prevailing culture. Welch was an entrepreneurial player who spent his early
formative years in GE’s Plastics Division scoring successes by avoiding, thwarting,
or manipulating GE’s rigid corporate bureaucracy. He knew the stifling effects of
the old, incremental, overly analytic, internally focused, arrogant, don’t-rock-the-boat
culture. So when he became CEO, he immediately set about replacing it with a new
externally focused culture that prizes speed, radical change, and constructive conflict.
His history as CEO is a story of selecting and developing leaders who, with
him, have ripped apart the old culture and continually regenerated the company.
Another school of management theorists who disdain leaders and who are rapidly
disappearing over the horizon are the reengineers. Reengineering came on the
scene as its close cousin the total quality movement peaked. Both of these have
very solid conceptual ideas and useful techniques. Unfortunately, their
reputations have become tarnished because they were applied too often by the
wrong people, by non-leaders. There is a multibillion-dollar consulting
industry in the world today that thrives largely on the fact that most managers
don’t want to lead. When non-leaders try to apply total quality management or
reengineering, they call in the consultants because, first of all, they don’t
know what to do, and, second, they are afraid of the tough part, the execution.
But this, of course, dooms the effort. If the people inside the company don’t know
what to do or are afraid to do it, the consultants aren’t likely to come up
with an appropriate and effective plan. And there’s absolutely no way that even
if the outsiders did, against the odds, come up with a good plan, it could be
implemented without solid leadership on the inside, from the people who live there
every day. I recently uncovered a $60 million expenditure in a Fortune 50
company to reengineer the organization, where the results were a disaster. The
turf battles were worse than before, teamwork did not exist, and neither layers
of management nor unproductive work had been removed. And management couldn’t
figure out why operations hadn’t improved.
In the small number of
cases, such as Motorola, AlliedSignal, Compaq, and GE, where the tools of total
quality and reengineering have been wielded by real leaders, the results have
been phenomenal. During Larry Bossidy’s first year at AlliedSignal, all 105,000
employees were trained in total quality. Productivity, which had been growing
at about 2%, grew on average 5.6% annually over the next five years. But more often than not,
TQM and reengineering never get anywhere near the desired finish line. When I
started to work with Ameritech in 1991, there were 100 full-time quality
facilitators and 5,000 quality groups. As current CEO Dick Notebaert recalls,
“We used to spend days of time going through the process, but we weren’t really
interested in results. We had celebrations about the process; ‘You just made it
to step four in a seven-step process. Let’s celebrate. Then Bill Weiss named
Notebaert and three others to form a new top leadership team. They got rid of
all the full-time facilitators, sending most of them back to real jobs adding
value. Then they gave the 5,000 quality groups 90 days to deliver financially
measurable results or be killed. Guess what? When Ameritech looked closely, only
about 10% of them could point to any financial results or any hope of financial
results. The rest had gotten lost in the morass of quality tools. In some
cases, enormously painful reengineering have set ailing companies on the road
to good health by realigning work processes and eliminating unnecessary tasks.
In other, all-too-frequent instances, the effort was called reengineering but involved
nothing more than wholesale firings that resulted in “corporate anorexia.” They
destroyed people’s lives and communities and only left the companies less able
to compete in the marketplace and weaker than ever. A survey by the American Management
Association found that only 45% of downsized companies reported any increase in
operating profits. In almost all the cases, whether successful or not, the radical
surgery was necessary because managers in the past had failed to exercise the
leadership needed to refocus the company and make smaller cuts sooner.
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