A number of management theorists don’t buy the argument that leadership is the key
factor in determining an organization’s success. They assert that a
winning culture, or efficient work processes, or any
number of other ancillary attributes are the sine qua nons for
success. I agree with them that those things are important. But
leadership takes precedence over everything else. One reason leadership takes
precedence is that leaders are the people who decide what
needs to be done and the ones who make things happen. Just
about everyone knew long before the 1960s that many Americans
were being denied basic rights and freedoms, but it took a
Martin Luther King Jr. and a handful of other determined leaders to
bring about the civil rights movement. In the 1960s in Detroit,
poor children were starving because their parents
couldn’t afford to buy them food. But it took a Father Bill
Cunningham and Eleanor Josaitis to start focus: HOPE, a feeding
program that they expanded into a full-scale community
organization that has trained over a thousand local residents to become
highly paid and highly sophisticated machinists. It’s true that one person
alone can’t change the world, or even a moderate-sized
organization. It takes the concentrated energy, ideas, and
enthusiasm of many people. But without a leader, the movement
doesn’t get started in the first place, or it quickly dies for lack of
direction or momentum. Without leaders, good results are a matter
of random chance, and therefore unsustainable. Another reason that leadership
takes precedence over the contributions of culture and management tools is that
it’s the leaders who create the cultures and use the tools. The management theorists
who assert that corporate culture not leadership is the key that determines the
success of an organization originally based their arguments on studies of the
Japanese automakers and technology companies that took U.S. markets by storm in
the 1970s and early 1980s. They bolstered their case by pointing to the strong
cultures that made such U.S. companies as Hewlett-Packard, General Electric,
IBM, and Xerox leaders in their fields. It’s an attractive theory, in part
because it holds out to non-leaders the hope that they can attain excellence if
they can only get themselves into the right culture. But the lesson that they
draw from the examples is not the right one. These successful cultures didn’t just
spring up by themselves and start shaping their members. As Professor Edgar
Schein of MIT’s Sloan School of Management has clearly shown, corporate culture
is developed at the birth of an organization by its leaders.2 Folksy Sam Walton, with his
down-home, we’re-all-in-this-together attitude, created a family of
“associates” (as Wal-Mart store personnel are called), all dedicated to low
prices and good service. Tom Watson, with his strict dress codes and company
songs, fashioned IBM into a triumphal army. Watson figured that you couldn’t be
the world’s No. 1 company unless you thought you were, so from day one, he
established an image of success.
As long as a culture fits
the marketplace, it succeeds, but when the external realities change, the
culture has to change as well. That’s where the proponents of cultural
determination go astray. They argue that good cultures will mend themselves.
But that’s simply not true. At certain critical stages, radical cultural shifts
are needed, and without leadership, they just don’t happen. IBM’s buttoned-down
army was a perfect vehicle to quickly establish dominance in the fledgling
computer industry. But by the 1980s, it was a drag. Under John Akers and other home-grown
managers, the army lumbered along, missing opportunity after opportunity and
losing market share to faster, more agile competitors such as Compaq, Dell, and
(until the early 1990s) Apple. Now, not only has IBM had to bring in a new CEO
from outside the company, but the new CEO, Lou Gerstner, had to hire key managers
from outside the company to run finance, accounting, human resources, strategy,
the consumer division, and for other key posts.
General Electric’s culture
is often cited as a paragon of successful durability, and its production of
Jack Welch is held up as the proof. But the truth is that Reginald Jones
selected Welch to succeed him as CEO because Welch was a radical deviant from
the prevailing culture. Welch was an entrepreneurial player who spent his early
formative years in GE’s Plastics Division scoring successes by avoiding, thwarting,
or manipulating GE’s rigid corporate bureaucracy. He knew the stifling effects of
the old, incremental, overly analytic, internally focused, arrogant, don’t-rock-the-boat
culture. So when he became CEO, he immediately set about replacing it with a new
externally focused culture that prizes speed, radical change, and constructive conflict.
His history as CEO is a story of selecting and developing leaders who, with
him, have ripped apart the old culture and continually regenerated the company.
Another school of management theorists who disdain leaders and who are rapidly
disappearing over the horizon are the reengineers. Reengineering came on the
scene as its close cousin the total quality movement peaked. Both of these have
very solid conceptual ideas and useful techniques. Unfortunately, their
reputations have become tarnished because they were applied too often by the
wrong people, by non-leaders. There is a multibillion-dollar consulting
industry in the world today that thrives largely on the fact that most managers
don’t want to lead. When non-leaders try to apply total quality management or
reengineering, they call in the consultants because, first of all, they don’t
know what to do, and, second, they are afraid of the tough part, the execution.
But this, of course, dooms the effort. If the people inside the company don’t know
what to do or are afraid to do it, the consultants aren’t likely to come up
with an appropriate and effective plan. And there’s absolutely no way that even
if the outsiders did, against the odds, come up with a good plan, it could be
implemented without solid leadership on the inside, from the people who live there
every day. I recently uncovered a $60 million expenditure in a Fortune 50
company to reengineer the organization, where the results were a disaster. The
turf battles were worse than before, teamwork did not exist, and neither layers
of management nor unproductive work had been removed. And management couldn’t
figure out why operations hadn’t improved.
In the small number of
cases, such as Motorola, AlliedSignal, Compaq, and GE, where the tools of total
quality and reengineering have been wielded by real leaders, the results have
been phenomenal. During Larry Bossidy’s first year at AlliedSignal, all 105,000
employees were trained in total quality. Productivity, which had been growing
at about 2%, grew on average 5.6% annually over the next five years. But more often than not,
TQM and reengineering never get anywhere near the desired finish line. When I
started to work with Ameritech in 1991, there were 100 full-time quality
facilitators and 5,000 quality groups. As current CEO Dick Notebaert recalls,
“We used to spend days of time going through the process, but we weren’t really
interested in results. We had celebrations about the process; ‘You just made it
to step four in a seven-step process. Let’s celebrate. Then Bill Weiss named
Notebaert and three others to form a new top leadership team. They got rid of
all the full-time facilitators, sending most of them back to real jobs adding
value. Then they gave the 5,000 quality groups 90 days to deliver financially
measurable results or be killed. Guess what? When Ameritech looked closely, only
about 10% of them could point to any financial results or any hope of financial
results. The rest had gotten lost in the morass of quality tools. In some
cases, enormously painful reengineering have set ailing companies on the road
to good health by realigning work processes and eliminating unnecessary tasks.
In other, all-too-frequent instances, the effort was called reengineering but involved
nothing more than wholesale firings that resulted in “corporate anorexia.” They
destroyed people’s lives and communities and only left the companies less able
to compete in the marketplace and weaker than ever. A survey by the American Management
Association found that only 45% of downsized companies reported any increase in
operating profits. In almost all the cases, whether successful or not, the radical
surgery was necessary because managers in the past had failed to exercise the
leadership needed to refocus the company and make smaller cuts sooner.
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